In this paper we discuss a leaderless protocol of low communicational complexity which allows a set of nodes to come to a consensus on a value of a bit. In addition, we assume that part of the nodes are Byzantine, i.e., they are controlled by an adversary who intends to either delay the consensus, or break it (i.e., make at least a couple of honest nodes come to different conclusions). We prove that, nevertheless, the protocol works with high probability when its parameters are suitably chosen, and we also provide some explicit estimates on the probability that the protocol finalizes in the consensus state in a given time. This protocol can possibly be applied to reaching consensus in decentralized cryptocurrency systems. A special feature of our protocol is that it makes use of a sequence of random numbers which are either provided by a trusted source or generated by the nodes themselves using some decentralized random number generating protocol.
may belong to an adversary, an entity which aims to delay the consensus or prevent it from happening altogether. We are interested in the situation (typical in the cryptocurrency applications) when the number n of nodes is large, and they are possibly quite (geographically) spread out, which makes the communicational costs very important; on the other hand, since these nodes usually live on modern computers, the computational complexity and the memory usage are of lesser concern.
There is a lot of classical work on (probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocols, see e.g. [2, 5, 6, 12, 13, 18] . The disadvantage of the approach of these papers is, however, that they typically require that the nodes exchange O(n 2 ) messages in each round (which means O(n) messages for each node); in the situation when the communicational complexity matters, this can be a showstopper. On the other hand, there was also a lot of research on the probabilistic models where, in each round, a node only contacts a small number of other nodes in order to learn their opinions and possibly change its own one. This type of models are usually called voter models in the literature; they were introduced in the 70s by Holley and Liggett [15] . Since then, there was a lot of related research; let us cite the papers [4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16] and references therein for the vast available literature on voter models specifically aimed at reaching consensus. However, in these works, the presence of adversarial nodes is usually either not allowed, or is supposed to be very minimal.
The distinguishing feature of this paper is that we allow a larger number of adversarial nodes, which may be a (fixed) proportion of the total number of nodes while keeping the communicational complexity low (see Corollary 2.3 below); even in this setting we guarantee fast convergence for all initial conditions. In compensation, here we do not require that with high probability the consensus should be achieved on the initial majority value. Rather, what we need, is the following:
(i) if, initially, no significant majority 1 of nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus should be 0 whp 2 ;
(ii) if, initially, a supermajority 3 of nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus should be 1 whp.
To explain why this is relevant in cryptocurrency applications, consider a situation when there are two contradicting transactions; for example, one of them transfers all the balance of address A 1 to address A 2 , while the other transfers all the balance of address A 1 to address A 3 = A 2 . In the case when neither of the two transactions is strongly preferred by the nodes of the network, by declaring both invalid we are on the safe side. On the other hand, it would not be a good idea to always declare them invalid. Indeed, if we do this, then a malicious actor would be able to exploit it in the following way: first, he places a legitimate transaction e.g. to buy some goods from a merchant. When he receives the goods, he publishes a doublespending transaction as above in the hope that both would be canceled by the system, and so he would effectively receive his money back (or at least take the money away from the merchant). To avoid this kind of development, it would be desirable if the first transaction (payment to the merchant) which, by that time, have probably gained some confidence from the nodes, would stay confirmed, and only the subsequent double-spend gets canceled.
As mentioned above, another important assumption that we make is that, among the totality of n nodes, there are qn adversarial (Byzantine) nodes 4 , who may not follow the proposed protocol and act maliciously in order to prevent the consensus (of the honest nodes) from being achieved. We assume that the adversarial nodes can exchange information freely between themselves and can agree on a common strategy; in fact, they all may be controlled by a single individual or entity. We also assume that the adversary is omniscient: at each moment of time, he is aware of the current opinion of every honest node. While this assumption may seem a bit too extreme, note that the adversarial nodes can query the honest ones a bit more frequently to be aware of the current state of the network; also, even if the "too frequent" queries are somehow not permitted, the adversary can still infer (with some degree of confidence) about the opinion of a given honest node by analyzing the history of this node's interactions with all the adversarial nodes.
The remaining (1 − q)n nodes are honest, i.e., they follow the recommended protocol. We assume that they are numbered from 1 to (1 − q)n; this will enter into several notations below.
Our protocol will be divided into epochs which we call rounds. The basic feature of it is that, in each round, each node may query k other nodes about their current opinion (i.e., preferred value of the bit). We allow k to be relatively large (say, k = 50 or so), but still assume that k n. We also assume that the complete list of the nodes is known to all the participants, and any node can directly query any other node.
With respect to the behavior of the adversarial nodes, there are two important cases to be distinguished:
• Cautious adversary 5 : any adversarial node must maintain the same opinion in the same round, i.e., respond the same value to all the queries it receives in that round.
• Berserk adversary: an adversarial node may respond different things to different queries in the same round.
The reason why the adversary may choose to be cautious, is the following: if it is not, this may be detected by the honest nodes (e.g., two honest nodes may exchange their query history and verify that the same node passed contradicting information to them). In such a case, the offender may be penalized by all the honest nodes (the nodes who discovered the fraud would pass that information along, together with the relevant proof 6 ). Since, in the sequel, we will see that the protocol provides more security and converges faster against a cautious adversary, it may be indeed a good idea for the honest nodes to adopt additional measures in order to detect the "berserk" behavior. Also, since k would be typically large and each node is queried k times in average during each round, we make a further simplifying assumption that a cautious adversary just chooses (in some way) the opinions of all his nodes before the current round starts and then communicates these opinions to whomever ask.
The protocol we are going to describe requires the system to generate, from time to time (more precisely, once in each round), a random number available to all the participants (this is very similar to the "global-coin" approach used in many works on Byzantine consensus, see e.g. [2] ). For the sake of cleanness of the presentation and the arguments, in this paper we assume that these random numbers are provided by a trusted source, not controlled by the adversary 7 . We observe that such random number generation can be done in a decentralized way as well (provided that the proportion q of the adversarial nodes is not too large), see e.g. [7, 17, 20, 22] . If a "completely decentralized" solution proves to be too expensive (from the point of view of computational and/or communicational complexity), one can consider "intermediate" ones, such as using a smaller committee for this, 5 also know as covert adversary, cf. [3] 6 of course, we assume that nodes have identities and sign all their messages; this way, one can always prove that a given message originates from a given node 7 i.e., the adversary may be omniscient (knows all information that exists now ), but he is not prescient (cannot know the future) and/or making use of many publicly available RNGs (such as, e.g., [1] ). It is important to observe that (as we will see from the analysis below), even if from time to time the adversary can get (total or partial) control of the random number, this can only lead to delayed consensus, but he cannot convince different honest nodes of different things, i.e., safety is not violated. Also, it is not necessary that really all honest nodes agree on the same number; if most of them do, this is already fine. This justifies the idea that, in our context, both decentralization and "strong consensus" are not of utter importance for the specific task of random number generation.
Before actually describing our protocol, it is important to note that we assume that there is no central entity that "supervises" the network and can somehow know that the consensus was achieved and therefore it is time to stop. This means that each node must decide when to stop using a local rule, i.e., using only the information locally available to it.
The protocol depends on a set of integer and real parameters:
• 1/2 < a ≤ b < 1, the threshold limits in the first round (they are needed to assure (i)-(ii) above);
• β ∈ (0, 1/2), the threshold limit parameter in the subsequent rounds;
• m 0 ∈ N, the cooling-off period;
• ∈ N, the number of consecutive rounds (when the cooling-off period is over) with the same opinion after which it becomes final, for one node. Now, let us describe our protocol. First, we assume that each node decides on the initial value of the bit, according to any reasonable rule 8 . Then, we describe the first round of the protocol in the following way:
• in the first round, each honest node j randomly queries other nodes k times (repetitions and self-queries are allowed 9 ) and records the number η 1 (j) of 1-opinions it receives;
• after that, the value of the random variable X 1 ∼ U [a, b] is made available to the nodes 10 ;
• then, each honest node uses the following decision rule: if k −1 η 1 (j) ≥ X 1 , it adopts opinion 1, otherwise it adopts opinion 0.
In the subsequent rounds, the dynamics is almost the same, we only change the interval where the uniform random variable lives:
• in the round m ≥ 2, each honest node j randomly queries other nodes k times, and records the number η m (j) of 1-opinions it receives;
• after that, the value of the random variable X m ∼ U [β, 1 − β] is made available to the nodes;
• then, each honest node which does not yet have final opinion uses the following decision rule: if k −1 η m (j) ≥ X m , it adopts opinion 1, otherwise it adopts opinion 0.
As mentioned above, if a honest node has the same opinion during consecutive rounds after the cooling-off period (i.e., counting from time m 0 + 1 on) this opinion becomes final.
Let us now explain informally what makes our protocol converge fast to the consensus even in the Byzantine setting. The general idea is the following: if the adversary knows the decision rules that the honest nodes use, he then can predict their behaviour and adjust his strategy accordingly, in order to be able to delay consensus and further mess with the system. Therefore, let us make these rules unknown to all the participants, including the adversary! Specifically, even though the adversarial nodes can control (to some extent) the expected proportion of 1-responses among the k queries, they cannot control the value that the "threshold" random variable assumes; as a consequence, the decision threshold X 1 will likely be "separated" from that typical proportion. When this separation happens, the opinions of the honest nodes would tend very strongly in one of the directions whp. Then, it will be extremely unlikely that the system leaves this "pre-consensus" state, due to the fact that the decision thresholds, however random, are always uniformly away from 0 and 1. Also, we mention that a similar protocol was considered in [23] ; however, there only "fixed thresholds" were used, which gives the adversary much more control, so that, in particular, the adversary could delay the consensus a lot.
Main results
We define two events relative to the final consensus value:
H i = {all honest nodes eventually reach final opinion i}, i = 0, 1. (1) Thus, the union H 0 ∪ H 1 stands for the event that all honest nodes agree on the same value, i.e., that the consensus was achieved.
Abbreviate
k(β−q) 2 ; we assume that k is large enough so that ϕ β,q,k > 0. Let N be the number of rounds until all honest nodes achieve their final opinions. The next result controls both the number of necessary rounds and the probability that the final consensus is achieved (i.e., the event H 0 ∪ H 1 occurs):
Theorem 2.1. Assume that q < β.
(i) For any strategy of a cautious adversary, it holds that
where
(ii) If the adversary is berserk, assume additionally that q+2 2k −1 ln
Then, for any adversarial strategy, we have
It is important to observe that, for the estimate in (4) to be nontrivial for at least some k, we must have q < 1 − 2β. Also, note that the only difference between (2) and (4) is that the ψ-term is substituted by the κ-term; as we will see in the proofs, these terms enter into the part which is "responsible" for the estimates on the time until one of the opinions reaches supermajority; from that moment on, there is essentially no difference if the adversary is cautious or berserk.
Corollary 2.2. For a cautious adversary we need that q < β, while for a berserk adversary we also need that q < 1 − 2β. Recalling also that β must belong to (0, 1/2), it is not difficult to see that
• for a cautious adversary, for any q < 1/2 and all large enough n we are able to adjust the parameters k, β, m 0 , in such a way that the protocol works whp (in particular, a β-value sufficiently close to 1/2 would work);
• however, for a berserk adversary, we are able to do the same only for q < 1/3 (here, β = 1/3 would work).
Corollary 2.3. One may be interested in asymptotic results, for example, of the following kind: assume that the number of nodes n is fixed (and large), and the proportion of Byzantine nodes q is acceptable (i.e., less than 1/2 for the case of cautious adversary, or less than 1/3 for the case of berserk adversary, as discussed above). We then want to choose the parameters of the protocol in such a way that the probabilities in (2) and (4) are at least 1 − ε(n), where ε(n) is polynomially small in n (i.e., ε(n) = O(n −h ) for some h > 0).
First, β = 1/3 works in both cases; then, a quick analysis of (2)-(4) shows that one possibility is: chose k = C ln n (with a sufficiently large constant in front), of constant order, and m 0 = O ln n ln ln n for cautious adversary or m 0 = O(ln n) for a berserk one.
That is, the overall communicational complexity will be at most O n ln 2 n ln ln n for cautious adversary and O(n ln 2 n) for a berserk one.
Next, letp 0 be the initial proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes. Our second result shows that if, initially, no significant majority of nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus will be 0 whp, and if the supermajority of nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus will be 1 whp (recall (i)-(ii) in the beginning of Section 1).
Theorem 2.4. In the following, we assume that q < β.
(i) First, suppose thatp 0 (1 − q) + q < a, and assume that k is sufficiently large so that
.
Then, we have
(ii) Now, suppose thatp 0 (1 − q) > b, and assume that k is sufficiently large so that
Then, the same estimate (6) holds for
We also mention that the estimates (2) and (4) are probably not quite sharp because we have used some union bounds and other "worst-case" arguments when proving them. For example, for n = 1000, k = 20, β = 1/3, = m 0 = 10, q = 0.1, the system was simulated 11 five thousand times, with all of them resulting in consensus after not more than 44 rounds; for these parameter values, the bounds provided by (2) and (4) are not quite useful. For a more concrete results on the number of necessary rounds until consensus (with different parameters), see Figure 1 . It is interesting to observe that, in most cases, the protocol finalizes after the minimal number m 0 + = 10 of rounds.
Proofs
We start with some preliminaries. Let us recall the Chernoff's bound for the binomial distribution 12 : if S k is a binomial B(k, p) random variable, then for 11 with the simple adversarial strategy "vote for the weakest" aiming to prevent the honest nodes from achieving supermajority of one of the opinions for as long as possible; however, we do not believe that the adversary can invent something radically better since, as we will see below, the adversary loses control completely after such a supermajority is any k and γ with 0 < γ < p < 1, we have
the same estimate (7) also holds for
in the case 0 < p < γ < 1. We will also use the Hoeffding's inequality [14] , which is not so precise as (7), but is more convenient to use in the case when γ and p are close: if 0 < γ < p < 1, then
and, as before, the same estimate also holds for P[k −1 S k ≥ γ] in the case 0 < p < γ < 1. In fact, we will use (9) much more frequently than (7) since it is more tractable analytically (imagine, for example, solving the equation H(γ, p) = c for γ with fixed p and c).
To better understand the difference between cautious and berserk adversaries, look at Figure 2 . Here,p is the initial proportion of 1-opinions between the honest nodes, and the crosses mark the proportion of 1-responses to the k queries that the honest nodes obtain. The cautious adversary can choose anỹ p ∈ [p(1 − q),p(1 − q) + q] (by adjusting the opinions of his nodes appropriately, so that the overall proportion of 1-opinions would bep), and then those crosses will be (mostly) concentrated in the interval of length of order k −1/2 aroundp. On the other hand, the berserk adversary can cause the crosses to be distributed in any way on the whole interval [p(1 − q),p(1 − q) + q], with some of them even going a bit out of it (on the distance of order k −1/2 again).
Next, we need an auxiliary result on a likely outcome of a round in the case when the adversary cannot make the typical proportion of 1-responses to be close to the decision threshold. Let η(j) be the number of 1-responses among k queries that jth honest node receives; in general, the random variables (η(j), j = 1, . . . , (1 − q)n) are not independent, but they are conditionally independent given the adversary's strategy. (Note that η(j) ∼ B(k,p) with some possibly randomp if the adversary is cautious, but the situation may be more complicated for a berserk one.) For a fixed λ ∈ (0, 1), define a random variablep
so thatp is the new proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes, given that the "decision threshold" equals λ. Then, the following result holds: 
(ii) Assume that, conditioned on any adversarial strategy, η(j) stochastically dominates B(k, λ+c) for all j = 1, . . . , (1−q)n, and P[B(k, λ+c) ≤ λk] ≤ θ. Then, for any v > 0
Proof. For (i), we observe that (1 − q)np is stochastically dominated by B(n, θ), and then (10) follows from (9) . The proof of the part (ii) is completely analogous.
Note that, by (9) , P[B(k, λ − c) ≥ λk] ≤ e −2kc 2 (and the same holds for
, so we will normally use Lemma 3.1 with θ = e −2kc 2 . Another elementary fact we need is
m , m ≥ 1), j = 1, . . . , N be N sequences of independent Bernoulli trials 13 with success probability h ∈ (0, 1). For j = 1, . . . , N define
13 the sequences themselves are not assumed to be independent between each other and
m− +1 = 0 to be the first moments when runs of ones (respectively, zeros) are observed in jth sequence. Then, for all u ∈ N,
for all j = 1, . . . , N , and
Proof. First, it is clear that
(divide the time interval [1, u] into u subintervals of length and note that each of these subintervals is all-1 with probability h ). Then, the following is an easy exercise on computing probabilities via conditioning (for the sake of completeness, we prove this fact in the Appendix):
Observe that (15) implies that (since 1 − h ≤ 1 and
, and so, using the above together with (14) and the union bound, we obtain (12) . The relation (13) is then a direct consequence of (12) (again, with the union bound).
To prove our main results, we need some additional notation. Let (j) be the round when the jth (honest) node finalizes its opinion. Denote R m = {j : (j) ≤ m} to be the subset of honest nodes that finalized their opinions by round m. Let alsoξ m (j) be the opinion of jth node after the mth round and
be the proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes after the jth round in the original system.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let us define the random variable
to be the round after which the proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes either becomes "too small", or "too large". We now need the following fact:
Lemma 3.3. For all s ≤ m 0 + , it holds that (recall (3) and (5))
Proof. Observe that s ≤ m 0 + implies that a node cannot finalize its opinion before round s. Consider first the case of a cautious adversary. Abbreviate (for this proof) µ = β−q 4(1−q)
. Let m ≥ 2 and observe that, for any fixed
Now, assume thatp m−1 = h. Under this, using (9) and (19), we obtain by conditioning on the value of X m
recall (3). This implies the first comparison in (18) . For a berserk adversary, the calculation is quite analogous (recall Figure 2) , so we omit it. . Then, since the difference between that and "the least possible threshold" β is at least
, the probability that an undecided node would have opinion 1 in the next round is at most e , and so it goes.
Next, we need a result that shows that if one of the opinions has already reached a supermajority, then this situation is likely to be preserved. , R m−1 = A, andξ m−1 (j) = 0 for all j ∈ A. Then
(ii) Let G 1 be the event thatp
Proof. We prove only part (i), the proof of the other part is completely analogous. Now, look at Figure 3 : essentially, this is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.1 with θ = e −2k(
k(β−q) 2 and v = ϕ β,q,k . Observe also that, if some honest nodes already decided on 0 definitely, it holds that (1 − q)np m+1 is stochastically dominated by B (1 − q)n, e (23) to be the first moment after Ψ when the honest nodes' opinion has drifted away from supermajority. Denote alsô
To obtain the estimates (2) and (4), it is enough to note that the lower bounds on, respectively, P[D 1 ], P[D 2 ], and P[D 3 ], follow from, respectively, Lemma 3.3, Lemma 3.4, and Lemma 3.2 (and also the union bound).
Proof of Theorem 2.4. We prove only the part (i); the proof of the other part is completely analogous. In fact, to obtain the proof it is enough to observe that, if a −p 0 (1 − q) − q > 0 and
, then, by (9) , with probability at least 1 − exp − 1 8
(so, in particular, Ψ = 1); next, the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 does the work.
Conclusion and final remarks
In this paper we described a consensus protocol which is able to withstand a substantial proportion of Byzantine nodes, and obtained some explicit estimates on its safety and liveness. A special feature of our protocol is that it uses a sequence of random numbers (produced by some external source or by the nodes themselves) in order to have a "randomly moving decision threshold" which quickly defeats the adversary's attempts to mess with the consensus. It is also worth noting that the "quality" of those random numbers is not critically important -only the estimates on Ψ (Lemma 3.3) will be affected in a non-drastic way. In particular, one can permit that the random numbers might be biased, or even that the adversary might get control of these numbers from time to time. Also, it is clear from the proofs that there is no need for the honest nodes to achieve consensus on the actual values of these random numbers: if some (not very large) proportion of honest nodes does not see the same number as the others, this will not cause problems. All this is due to the fact that, when the proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes becomes "too small" or "too large" (i.e., less than in our proofs), the adversary does not have any control anymore.
We need to comment on anti-Sybil measure in practical implementations: indeed, it would be quite unfortunate if the adversary is able to deploy an excessively large number of nodes, thus inflating the value of q. One of possible approaches is using a variant of Proof-of-Stake; with it, when querying, one needs to choose the node proportionally to its weight (stake).
Of course, one may consider also further modifications of the protocol. For example, one can get rid of the cooling-off period or make its length depend on the "strength" of the prevailing opinion in the first rounds (but then should probably be increased), consider different final acceptance rules (for example, at least − y node's opinions among the last must be the same), and so on. (
and, conditioning on the number of consecutive ones in the beginning, we obtain that and we then obtain (24) by using the obvious relation P[τ < σ] = (1 − h)p 0 + hp 1 .
